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Abstract 
Five experiments investigated the cognitive processes involved in the elaboration of 
past and future events. A production listing procedure was used, in which participants 
listed details of each event in forwards chronological order, backwards chronological 
order, or free order. For both past and future events, forwards and free ordering 
conditions were reliably faster than backwards order. Production rates between past 
and future temporal directions did not differ in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 3. However, 
in Experiment 2, the elaboration of future events was faster than the elaboration of 
past events. This pattern can be explained by the findings of Experiment 4, in which 
production rates were faster for likely events than for unlikely events but only in the 
future condition. Overall, the findings suggest that the elaboration of future, but not 
past, events, is facilitated when constructed around current goals.  
Keywords; mental time travel; episodic memory, future simulation, executive 
resources, event likelihood, goals. 
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Episodic Elaboration: Investigating the structure of retrieved past events and 
imagined future events. 
1. Introduction 
Episodic memory constitutes the ‘system that receives and stores information 
about temporally dated episodes or events’ (Tulving, 1983, p. 21). It incorporates 
autonoetic consciousness, whereby individuals mentally time travel into a past event 
through sensory and perceptual re-experiencing and identification of the event as a 
part of their personal existence (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Episodic 
memories, together with personal semantic information, create a system of 
autobiographical knowledge structures that maintain information on the progress of 
personal goals and provide a coherent sense of self identity (Conway, 2001, 2005). 
Recently, a growing body of literature has explored the notion that the mental time 
travel system used for episodic recall is also used to imagine events in the future. It 
has been posited that individuals use their memory as a database of information 
through a process of flexible reconstruction to generate descriptions of novel future 
scenarios (Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b; e.g. Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 
2008). This constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, therefore, suggests that 
similar cognitive and neural structures and processes should be engaged in both 
episodic memory retrieval and future episodic simulation.  
The retrieval of an episode from memory is thought to constitute a two-stage 
process (see S. J. Anderson & Conway, 1993; Conway, 2001). The first stage, 
construction, involves the retrieval of a memory of a particular event from the large 
database of information held about one’s personal past. This process can require an 
effortful top-down search, termed generative retrieval, which ensues voluntarily in 
response to a particular cue. However, in some cases, it can occur via a non-effortful 
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and involuntary pathway, termed direct retrieval, whereby the representation is 
automatically generated through a bottom-up process without the need for executive 
resources. The second stage of retrieval, elaboration, occurs as the individual holds 
the constructed event within working memory and pieces together the disparate 
details to provide a coherent description of the event (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, & Whitecross, 2001; Conway & Rubin, 1993). To 
date, a growing body of literature has compared the cognitive processes involved in 
constructing past and future episodes. In contrast, there has been relatively little 
research specifically comparing the elaboration phase of past and future episodic 
thinking. To date, the only direct comparison between the elaboration phase of past 
and future thinking is a neuroimaging study by Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2007). As 
Addis et al. noted, previous studies have typically collapsed across the construction 
and elaboration phases. The aim of the current study was to compare the cognitive 
processes involved in the elaboration of past and future episodes.  
Research exploring the construction phase of episodic memories and future 
thoughts provides support for the notion that the same cognitive and neural substrates 
are involved in both processes. Work by D’Argembeau and colleagues (D’Argembeau 
& Demblon, 2012; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) suggests that autobiographical 
knowledge structures provide a framework for organising future events, with personal 
goals acting as key anchors within this organisational framework. This work, 
alongside other behavioural studies, suggest that future event simulation often 
involves a search through these hierarchically organised information structures, and 
makes use of similar generative and direct pathways to access episodic information as 
are evidenced in memory retrieval (R. J. Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012; 
Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). Furthermore, neuroimaging 
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work has demonstrated that past and future thinking engage the same core 
autobiographical memory network (See Schacter et al., 2012 for a review).  
Alongside these similarities, however, a number of differences have emerged 
with respect to the mental construction of past and future episodes. For instance, 
behavioural findings suggest that spontaneous future thinking is more abstract (R. J. 
Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009) and generation of specific events in response to cue 
words is slower for future compared with past events (R. J. Anderson et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, neuroimaging data demonstrate increased neural activity and a number 
of differentially recruited areas when an individual is constructing future, compared 
with past, events (e.g. Addis et al., 2007). It has been argued that, whilst both 
processes source details from the same autobiographical memory information system, 
future thinking is a more effortful process. Future episodic simulation, unlike memory 
retrieval, involves flexible recombination of episodic details and it is this additional 
activity that places increased demands on the underlying cognitive, particularly 
executive, resources. This is illustrated by the finding of D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, 
Jumentier, & van der Linden (2010) that the specificity of future events was 
positively correlated with executive processes but the specificity of past events was 
not. Similarly, a neuropsychological study by de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, Baroni, 
Amboni, and Dalla Salla (2012) found that impaired future thinking in Parkinson’s 
Disease was associated with poor executive control. Taken together, these studies 
support the notion that the construction of future episodes is often an effortful process 
and that, in comparison to retrieval of past events, can place increased demands upon 
executive resources. 
As noted above, there has been relatively little research explicitly comparing 
the elaboration stage of past and future episodic thought. The neuroimaging study by 
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Addis et al. (2007) investigated the neural activity associated with the construction 
and elaboration of past and future events. Differences were observed between past 
and future thinking during the construction phase, with both the right hippocampus 
and frontopolar aspects of the right medial prefrontal cortex being uniquely recruited 
during the construction of future events. In contrast, they found extensive overlap in 
neuronal activity when comparing past and future elaboration, particularly in areas 
known to respond to self-referential material such as the left medial pre-frontal cortex. 
They did, however, evidence activation in the posterior right middle temporal gyrus 
and the left parietal lobule when an individual elaborated upon a future, compared 
with past, event. The latter of these areas is thought to be involved in the selective 
retrieval of information from within memory. Addis et al argued that future event 
simulation is likely to place heavier demands on selective retrieval processes than 
episodic memory retrieval due to the need to combine disparate details from 
numerous episodic events within memory in order to create a novel future scenario.  
Previous behavioural research into the elaboration phase has primarily focused 
on the descriptions of past and future events. For instance, when individuals are asked 
to freely describe future episodes they contain significantly less episodic and sensory 
detail compared with their memory counterparts. However, to date, there is little work 
exploring the organisation of information within, and the cognitive processes 
underlying, the elaboration stage of future event simulation. In order to elucidate the 
role of memory in imagining future events, it is important to establish not only how 
we construct future events, but also how we elaborate upon them and the processes 
used in piecing together, structuring and organising the individual episodic details 
into a coherent description. 
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 S. J. Anderson and Conway (1993) developed a production listing procedure 
to examine the process of elaboration when retrieving episodes from memory. They 
asked participants to recall autobiographical events and write a list of the distinctive 
details of the event. The dependent variable varied across experiments, and was either 
the number of details listed within a set timeframe (10 and 30 seconds) or the time 
taken to list 10 details. By manipulating task demands, whereby detailing instructions 
varied so that events were described in one of four different orders (forwards 
chronological, backwards chronological, order of interest or free recall), they 
examined the role of temporal and thematic structures in the organisation of 
information within specific events. They argued that the free recall condition would 
engage the participants’ spontaneous production strategies and, thus, would have the 
fastest production rates. They argued that the other conditions required participants to 
organise their knowledge prior to responding; therefore, if temporal (forwards and 
backwards chronological ordering) and/or thematic (order of interest) knowledge 
represented the underlying organisation structure of autobiographical elaboration then 
production rates would closely resemble those seen in the free recall condition.  S.J. 
Anderson and Conway found that production rates were fastest in the free recall and 
forward chronological conditions, suggesting that temporal knowledge guides the 
organisation of information during the elaboration process. Slower responses within 
the order of interest condition suggested that thematic knowledge may not be 
important in the ordering of details within memory reconstruction; however, the role 
of thematic structures was clarified in a further experiment where, through use of a 
memory verification procedure in which participants indicated whether or not a 
presented detail was part of a previously retrieved memory, the authors demonstrated 
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that accessing a distinctive chunk of memory details often acts a first step to memory 
construction.  
The current study reports a series of experiments investigating the 
organisation of information during the elaboration of simulated future events and 
retrieved memories. This allowed a direct comparison of the organisational structures 
guiding, and cognitive effort involved in, the elaboration of future simulations and 
memories. Experiments 1a and 1b employed production listing procedures identical to 
those used by S.J. Anderson and Conway (1993), with the additional manipulation of 
temporal direction. Participants were asked to elaborate on past/future events that 
were retrieved or simulated in response to cue words; temporal direction of events and 
elaboration order instructions were manipulated within-subjects.  In experiment 1a the 
number of details generated after 10 and 30 seconds was recorded, whilst experiment 
1b measured the time taken to list 10 distinctive details. These experiments 
investigated the hypothesis that, in line with the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis, past and future elaboration would make use of similar underlying 
processes.  Specifically, we investigated whether elaborating upon future events 
would make use of temporal knowledge structures to organise information in a similar 
way to memory retrieval.  
These initial studies also investigated whether the elaboration of future events 
is more or less effortful than the elaboration of memories. It was more difficult to 
predict how elaboration of future simulations and memories would compare with 
respect to effortful processing. Given the need to selectively retrieve information from 
disparate memory traces in order to elaborate on future episodes, it is feasible to 
suggest that this process may place greater demand on executive resources than the 
elaboration of episodes from memory. Piecing together disparate details to make a 
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coherent future event may be a more time-consuming process that requires effort to 
manipulate and choose from the wide variety of available episodic details. If this is 
the case, the time taken to record episodic details would be longer for future, 
compared with past, episodes.  
2. Experiment 1a 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Design 
A 2x4 within subjects design, with independent variables of temporal direction 
(past vs. future) and elaboration order (forwards vs. backwards vs. interest vs. free 
recall), was used.  The dependent variables were number of details recorded after 10 
and 30 seconds.  
2.1.2. Participants 
Twenty participants (14 females) completed the study. Ages ranged from 18 to 
40 years (M = 22.20, SD = 5.77). All were undergraduate students and received 
course credit in exchange for participation. 
2.1.3. Materials & Procedure  
Participants completed a past recall and a future imagination task, with the 
order of the two tasks counterbalanced across participants. In each task they were 
presented with a series of cue words on a computer screen. The cue words, presented 
using E-prime, consisted of 32 high imagery nouns drawn from Rubin & Friendly 
(1986). Four practice and twelve experimental cues were presented for each of the 
past and future tasks; thus participants recalled and simulated three events in each of 
the elaboration orders. 
For each cue word participants were asked to recall/imagine a specific event 
that happened (or could feasibly happen) on one particular day in the past/future. As 
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soon as they had an event in mind they were to press the space bar and give a brief 
verbal title of the event to the researcher; then one of four possible listing protocols 
appeared on the screen (forwards chronological, backwards chronological, order of 
interest, or free recall in the order in which they come to mind). For forwards 
chronological order participants were instructed to list the details from the first to the 
last detail as they occurred (or would occur) temporally, whilst backwards 
chronological order was the reversal of this with details listed from the last to the first 
detail.  The order of interest listing protocol was described as how they might order 
the information in conversation with a friend, when they would discuss the most 
interesting details first and move onto the less interesting details afterwards. Equal 
numbers of cues were assigned to each listing protocol, with cue word and listing 
protocol presentation randomised. Participants were instructed to provide a 
description of the event, writing down individual episodic details (3-5 words), as 
quickly as possible, whilst adhering to the listing protocol specified. Each detail was 
to be recorded on a separate line of the response sheet and could consist of any 
episodic information pertaining to the event that they regarded as a distinct detail, 
such as other people present, actions, feelings, thoughts, emotions, perceptual details, 
locations, or time information. Two examples are provided of the memories and 
future events constructed and elaborated upon in response to the cue word 
“magazine”. One participant recalled “reading a funny story about a squirrel in the 
newspaper” with the following episodic details provided in a forwards listing 
protocol: “At the top of my street”; “waiting for Steph”; “she texts me”; “I go into 
shop”; “buy newspaper”; “walk outside”; “Steph arrives”; “get in car”; laugh at 
newspaper”. Another participant simulated “reading about my friend in a magazine” 
in order of interest protocol: “feeling shocked”; “recognising friend in picture”; 
EPISODIC	  ELABORATION	   	   11	  
“feeling confused”; ringing another friend”; “reading headline”; “upset”; “picking up 
magazine from doormat”.    
After 10 seconds, the experimenter recorded which detail the participant was 
currently working on and after 30 seconds the participant was instructed to stop as 
soon as they had finished the current detail. 
2.2. Results 
Two separate repeated measures 2x4 ANOVAs assessed the impact of 
temporal direction (past vs. future) and elaboration order (forwards vs. backwards vs. 
interest vs. free recall) on the number of details generated after 10 and 30 seconds 
(Table 1). In both cases, main effects of elaboration order emerged: details after 10 
seconds, F(3,54)=21.41, p<.001, ηp2=.82; details after 30 seconds, F(3,57)=15.91, 
p<.001, ηp2=.76.  Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that in both 
cases the number of details did not differ between the free and forwards listing 
protocols (p>.05), nor between the backwards and interest conditions (p>.05). The 
number of details produced after 10 and 30 seconds were, however, significantly 
faster in both free and forwards conditions compared with the backwards and interest 
conditions (all ps < .01).  With respect to both the number of details generated after 
10, and after 30, seconds, neither the main effect of temporal direction nor the 
temporal direction x elaboration order interaction were significant (all ps>.14).  
3. Experiment 1b   
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Design 
Identical to Experiment 1a, a 2 (temporal direction) x4 (elaboration order) 
within subjects design was used. The only modification was with respect to the 
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dependent variable, which in this instance was the response latency to produce ten 
distinctive episodic event details.  
3.1.2. Participants 
Nineteen participants (14 females) completed the study. Ages ranged from 18 
to 27 years (M = 19.74, SD = 2.21). All were undergraduate students and received 
course credit in exchange for participation. 
3.1.3. Materials & Procedure  
The procedure for the past recall and future imagination tasks was identical to 
those used in Experiment 1a. The only difference was that participants, in this 
instance, were instructed to write down ten individual episodic details, as quickly as 
possible, for each event. The response time to generate ten details was recorded; as 
soon as the participant completed the tenth detail the experimenter pressed the space 
bar and Eprime recorded the time lag between presentation of listing protocol on the 
screen and completion of the tenth detail.   In each case, participants were able to list 
10 details for events retrieved/simulated. 
3.2. Results  
A repeated measures 2x4 ANOVA assessed the impact of temporal direction 
(past vs. future) and elaboration order (forwards vs. backwards vs. interest vs. free 
recall) on mean response times to list ten episodic details (Table 2). A main effect of 
elaboration order emerged, F(3,54)=20.41, p<.001, ηp2=.88. Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons revealed an identical pattern to that seen in Experiment 1a, with 
listing response times not differing between the free and forwards listing protocols 
(p>.05), nor between the backwards and interest conditions (p>.05). Listing response 
times were, however, significantly faster in both free and forwards conditions 
compared with the backwards and interest conditions (all ps < .01). Neither the main 
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effect of temporal direction, F(1,18)=0.12, p=.73, nor the temporal direction x 
elaboration order interaction, F (3,54)=0.22, p=.88, were significant.  
3.3. Discussion 
Experiments 1a and b examined the role of temporal and thematic knowledge 
in the organisation of information during event elaboration, comparing simulation of 
future episodes with the retrieval of past episodes. It also examined whether future 
event elaboration was a more effortful, and thus slower, task than elaboration of 
remembered episodes. The findings, irrespective of the dependent variable used, 
found that production rates did not differ across past and future episodes. They did, 
however, differ as a function of ordering method. Forwards chronological and free 
ordering conditions did not differ from each other, but both were significantly faster 
than the backwards chronological and order of interest conditions.  
Our findings support those of S. J. Anderson and Conway (1993) who 
demonstrated that temporal organisation in a forwards chronological order guides the 
elaboration process within episodic memory recall. Furthermore, it extends these 
findings to suggest that temporal organisation is equally important when elaborating 
upon simulations of future events. However, no evidence was found to suggest that 
elaborating upon a possible future scenario was more effortful than recalling the 
details of a past event. This is consistent with the findings of Addis et al (2007) of 
extensive overlap of neural activity when comparing the elaboration phase of past and 
future episodes. However, Addis et al also found selective activation in the posterior 
right middle temporal gyrus and the left parietal lobule associated with the elaboration 
of future events. These subtle differences were not, however, picked up by the 
behavioural measures used in the current study.  
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Replicating and extending the paradigm used by S. J. Anderson and Conway 
(1993), whereby participants were cued to recall and simulate events using nouns, 
provided a useful starting point to investigate the organisation of information within 
simulated future episodes. There are, however, limitations to this cue-word 
methodology that may have contributed to the null effect of temporal direction. It is 
feasible that ease of elaboration is related to the temporal distance of an event from 
the present, as previous research has suggested that close events are rated as more 
vivid and rich in sensory detail than distant events (D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 
2004). It is possible that, in the present investigation, future events were closer in time 
and past events further away, resulting in events that could be described with similar 
ease. Whilst participants in the current research were not asked to report the temporal 
distance of the events they recalled and simulated, such a pattern was reported in our 
previous work that made use of a similar cue word methodology (R.J. Anderson et 
al.,2012).Other factors that may have contributed to the null effect of temporal 
direction relate specifically to the elaboration of future events. It is possible that 
participants rely heavily on schemas to generate future events; for instance, the cue 
word restaurant may cue a script for what someone does in a restaurant, without any 
preliving of a specific event (see Alba & Hasher, 1983, for a review of schema 
theory). Alternatively, participants may simply be recasting entire memories into the 
future.  
The remaining experiments reported here were designed to overcome the 
alternative explanations that hindered interpretation the findings of experiments 1a 
and 1b. Modifications include methods to control the temporal distance of past and 
future events and ensuring that the events elaborated upon, particularly those in the 
future, were novel.  
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In Experiment 2 we modified the paradigm used in Experiments 1a and 1b, 
with the aim of controlling the temporal distance of recalled and simulated events . 
The cue word technique makes it difficult to control for differences in temporal 
distance. Instructions can include temporal constraints, such as asking participants to 
recall/simulate events from the last/next month. However, previous work suggests 
that the construction of events, particularly memories, is made more difficult by such 
constraints (e.g. R. J. Anderson et al., 2012); this would, potentially, significantly 
reduce the number of events available for elaboration. Thus, in Experiment 2, 
participants were asked in an initial testing session to outline forty brief titles of 
events, with 20 event titles pertaining to memories of events that happened in either 
the distant or near past and 20 event titles pertaining to specific future events that 
could feasibly happen in the near or distant future. By asking participants to self 
generate events in Experiment 2 we also began to investigate the role that schematic 
representations play in the elaboration of past and future events. In particular, we 
investigated the extent to which the events generated comprised cultural life scripts 
events; such events represent occurrences that are culturally expected within a typical 
adult lifespan and, thus, they represent events for which individuals are likely to hold 
schematic representations within semantic memory. Previous research has suggested 
that cultural life script events provide a thematic structure that can guide both retrieval 
and simulation processes (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004). 
A random selection of the event titles generated in the first part of the 
experiment were then used in a second testing session, where participants were asked 
to elaborate on the events using a paradigm similar to that employed in Experiment 
1b. The only modification was the exclusion of the ‘interest’ listing protocol. This 
was because participants in first experiment, and in the previous work of S. J. 
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Anderson and Conway (1993), expressed difficulty understanding the instructions for 
this particular listing protocol and it evidenced similar response times to the 
backwards chronological listing procedure. Furthermore, the increased complexity of 
this study meant that the inclusion of sufficient trials in each condition extended the 
duration of the recall and imagination tasks, risking participant fatigue. 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Design  
A 2x2x3 within subjects design was employed, with independent variables of 
temporal direction (past vs. future), temporal distance (near vs. distant) and 
elaboration order (forwards vs. backwards vs. free recall). As in Experiment 1b, the 
dependent variable was the response latency to produce ten distinctive episodic event 
details.  
4.1.2. Participants  
Twenty-one participants (17 females) took part in this study. All were 
undergraduate students at the University of Hull and received course credit for their 
participation. Ages ranged from 18 to 37 years (M = 19.00; SD = 4.80). 
4.1.3. Materials & Procedure 
This study was conducted in across two testing sessions. In the first session, 
participants were instructed to provide 40 brief titles of events that had happened in 
the past or could feasibly happen in the future. Participants were informed that they 
each event needed to be a specific event, defined as an event that happened, or would 
happen, on one particular day and were given an example of an appropriate response. 
They were asked to provide titles for ten events that had happened over a year ago 
(distant past), ten events that had happened in the past month (near past), ten events 
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that could happen feasibly in the next month (near future), and ten events that could 
feasibly happen over one year from now (distant future). For each event they were 
asked to provide sufficient detail that it was clear the event happened (or would 
happen) on one particular day and to give an approximate date for the event. Thematic 
analyses were conducted to ascertain the types of events generated within this first 
part of the study using categories of life script events developed by Berntsen and 
Rubin (2004); RJA  coded all 40 events generated by each participants, assessing 
whether or not each represented a life script events. A second, independent, rater 
coded all events, with the two raters agreeing on 98% of all events. Any 
disagreements were discussed between the two raters and resolved.  
The second session took place exactly one week later. This time lag was 
chosen for two reasons; the experimenters required time to prepare the materials for 
the second session and it fitted most appropriately with the participants’ timetables 
whilst ensuring that the time-lag between sessions was identical for all participants. 
Twenty four event titles from session one, six from each time period (near past, 
distant past, near future, distant future), were used as cues for recall and imagination 
tasks similar to those employed in Experiments 1a and 1b. The two tasks were 
counterbalanced across participants, and within each task the near and distant events 
were blocked with presentation order of these blocks randomised. Both recall and 
imagination tasks were preceded by three practice trials. The event title, along with 
instructions to list details in one of three possible listing protocols (forwards 
chronological, backwards chronological or order in which they came to mind), were 
presented together on the screen. As in Experiment 1b, participants listed 10 episodic 
details, as quickly as possible, with response time to list the 10 details being recorded. 
In each case, participants were able to list 10 details for each of the event titles 
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provided. After completing the experiment participants were given a list of all events 
and asked to indicate if any had occurred during the past week (the period between 
testing sessions); this was not the case for any of the distant past, near future, or 
distant future events. 
4.2. Results 
  Thematic analyses established the mean percentage of events generated in the 
first part of the experiment that constituted cultural life script events. For recalled 
events, 10.38% (SD=9.44) of near, and 42.24% (SD=19.50) of distant, events referred 
to life script events. For simulated future events, 4.29% (SD=5.98) of near, and 
42.33% (SD=11.10) of distant, events were coded as life script events. A 2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA ascertained whether differences existed in the proportion of events 
that constituted cultural life script events as a function of temporal direction (past vs. 
future) and temporal distance (near vs. distant). The main effect of temporal distance 
was significant, F(1,20)=149.57, p<.001, ηp2 = .88. Temporally distant, compared 
with temporally near, events were more likely to refer to a cultural life script event. 
The main effect of temporal direction, F(1,20)=1.49, p=.24, and the interaction effect, 
F(1,20)=1.36, p=.26, were not significant.  
A 2x2x3 repeated measures ANOVA examined the effects of temporal 
direction (past vs. future), temporal distance (near vs. distant) and elaboration order 
(free vs. forwards vs. backwards) on mean response latency to list 10 episodic details 
(Table 3). The main effects of temporal direction, F(1,20)=4.96, p<.05, ηp2=.20, and 
temporal distance, F(1,20)=8.85, p<.01, ηp2=.31, were both significant. Future events 
took less time to be elaborated on compared to past events, while elaborating on 
temporally close events was quicker than elaborating on distant events. A main effect 
of elaboration order also emerged, F(2,40) = 9.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. Bonferroni-
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adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that, similar to Experiment 1, no significant 
difference existed in elaboration response times in the free and forwards listing 
protocols (p>.05). However, both of these elaboration orders were significantly faster 
than when participants listed details in a backwards order (ps<.01). The temporal 
direction x temporal distance, (F(1,20) =.13, p=.73, ηp2=.01), temporal direction x 
elaboration order (F(2,40) = 1.08, p = .35, ηp2 = .05), and the temporal distance x 
elaboration order (F(2,40) = .36, p = .70, ηp2 = .02) all failed to reach significance. 
4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 used a modified methodology designed to limit the effect of 
potential  differences in temporal distance on the ease of event elaboration. The 
findings, in line with those from Experiments 1a and 1b, suggested that temporal 
organisation of information is used when elaborating on both past and future events. 
Additionally, there was no support for the notion that future elaboration is a more 
effortful process. In fact, production rates were faster when elaborating on future, 
compared with past, events. This finding is consistent with recent theoretical models 
proposing that one of the adaptive functions of memory is its role in future planning 
(e.g. Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010). 
As Klein (2007) argues, complex and effortful cognitive systems do not evolve by 
chance. Instead, their functional organisation exists in its current form because it has 
positively influenced the ability to survive and reproduce. By this reasoning, the 
reconstructive nature of episodic memory exists because it serves an adaptive function 
by providing a database of episodic details for simulating potential future events. If 
this is the case, the underlying systems will have evolved to ensure that creating 
descriptions of future events does not represent a more effortful process than memory 
retrieval. This may become particularly pertinent when the simulated event is highly 
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likely to occur in the future because it fits closely with an individual’s overarching 
working goals.  
The current experimental design ensured that the temporal distance of events 
were comparable for past and future events.  However, it is feasible that the 
modifications to the experimental procedure did not prevent participants from 
recasting memories or from using schemas when elaborating on future events. 
Recently, research has begun to consider the extent to which it is possible to imagine 
future episodes without relying wholly on details drawn from episodic memories (e.g. 
R. J. Anderson, 2012; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Rubin, 2014; Szpunar, 2010). 
Specifically, Rubin (2014) has argued that future events might be created from 
schema, which serve as general principles abstracted from specific past experiences; 
the details that are added could then come from a range of sources and, again, may 
not necessarily tied to specific past experiences. Furthermore, Szpunar (2010) argued 
that as individuals experience repeated similar events the details become more 
abstracted from individual episodic memories. Thematic analyses suggested that 
approximately 25% of all events represented cultural life script events, which 
arguably constitute schematic representations of culturally expected events held 
within semantic memory. However, the percentage of cultural life script events did 
not differ as a function of temporal direction; thus, the faster elaboration of future 
events does not seem to have been a function of these events representing schematised 
life script events. Nevertheless, if participants were describing highly familiar 
scenarios containing little novelty then, within the context of the arguments presented 
by Rubin and Szpunar, it is still feasible that the details reported were not being 
drawn from episodic memory; instead, they may have formed abstracted 
representations within schemas created from repeated past experiences.  In this 
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context it is unsurprising that elaborative details for future events were produced at a 
faster rate. 
The final two experiments aimed to elucidate further on the potential role of 
memory recasting and schemas by investigating the roles of prior experience and 
event likelihood on the elaboration of past and future events. Experiment 3 made use 
of a life events inventory, adapted from Garry, Manning and Loftus (1996), whereby 
participants rated their prior experience of 40 episodic events. These events then 
served as cues for event elaboration. The events were chosen on the basis of being 
unusual, and therefore unlikely, occurrences that people might experience once or 
twice in a lifetime (e.g. go on a hot air balloon ride). It was anticipated that 
participants would have prior experience of some, but not all, events. The use of 
unlikely events meant that even those that had been previously experienced were 
unlikely to have happened to participants on repeated occasions; thus the potential for 
information to have been abstracted from such experiences was controlled. In short, 
we manipulated participants’ prior experience of similar events (old vs. new events) 
whilst controlling for event likelihood (all events were unlikely). Specifically, we 
were interested in whether the elaboration of novel future events, whereby the 
individual has no prior experience of similar events, is a more effortful process as 
would be indicated by longer production rates for episodic details. If the elaboration 
of novel future events proved to be a more effortful process then this would suggest 
that the findings in the first two experiments occurred as a result of memory recasting 
and/or the use of schemas during the elaboration of future events.  
5. Experiment 3 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Design 
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A within subjects design was employed, with independent variables of 
temporal direction (past vs. future), prior experience (old vs. new) and elaboration 
order (forwards vs. backwards vs. free recall). Due to the nature of the temporal 
direction and prior experience variables, it was not feasible to ask participants to 
recall events that were ‘new’ (where they had no prior experience). Therefore, 
participants recalled events for which they had prior experience (past-old) and 
imagined events for which they did (future-old) and did not (future-new) have prior 
experience. This allowed the effects of temporal direction (past-old vs. future-old) and 
prior experience (future-old vs. future-new) to be assessed separately. The dependent 
variable was identical to those in Experiments 1b and 2. 
5.1.2. Participants 
Twenty-one University of Hull undergraduates (16 females) received course 
credit in return for participation. Ages ranged from 18 to 53 (M = 24.14; SD = 9.96). 
5.1.3. Materials & Procedure  
As in Experiment 2, participants attended two testing sessions one week apart. 
In the first session, participants completed a life events inventory comprising 40 event 
titles. Some items were taken from Garry et al (1996) with the remaining items 
developed specifically for this investigation. Each event was chosen for its potential 
novelty, with any prior occurrences likely to have been a single occurrence happening 
on one particular day in the past (e.g. watch a house burn down; go on a hot air 
balloon ride; get lost in a city you don’t know). For each event, participants indicated 
if the event had, or had not, happened to them previously. 
In the second session, participants completed recall and imagination tasks, 
similar to those in our earlier experiments. The cues for these tasks were selected 
from the life events inventory and were based on the ratings made in the first session. 
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Eighteen events were selected as cues for the recall and imagination tasks. Six events 
had never previously happened to the participant and were used as cues for the 
imagination task (future-new). The other twelve events had been experienced 
previously, with six being used as cues for the recall task (past-old) and six for the 
imagination task (future-old). Future-old and future-new event titles were combined 
into a single imagination task, in which they were presented at random. The order of 
presenting the recall and imagination tasks was counterbalanced over participants, 
with each being preceded by three practice trials. As in Experiment 2, all participants 
were able to list 10 details for each of the event titles provided and on completion of 
the experiment we checked that no participants had experienced any of the listed 
events in the week between the two testing sessions.  
5.2. Results 
A 2x3 ANOVA was used to explore the effect of temporal direction (past-old 
vs. future-old) and elaboration order (backwards vs. forwards vs. free recall) on mean 
response times to generate ten episodic details (Table 4). A main effect of elaboration 
order emerged, (F(2,40)=3.97, p<.05, ηp2=.17). Consistent with earlier studies, the 
backwards listing protocol resulted in significantly slower response times to produce 
ten episodic details compared with the free and forwards listing protocols (ps<.01), 
which did not differ from each other (p>.05). Neither the main effect of temporal 
direction, F(1,20)=1.49, p=.24, nor the temporal direction x elaboration order 
interaction, F(2,40)=2.35, p=.11, were significant. 
A further 2x3 ANOVA examined the effects of prior experience (future-old 
vs. future-new) and elaboration order (backwards vs. forwards vs. free recall). The 
main effect of prior experience was not significant, F(1,20)=0.38, p=.55. A main 
effect of elaboration order did, however, emerge, F(2,40)=16.24, p<.01, ηp2=.46. 
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in previous analyses, listing in backwards order was significantly slower than listing 
in forwards order (p<.01), yet the free listing order did not differ significantly from 
either of these (ps>.05). This was qualified by a trend towards a significant prior 
experience x elaboration order interaction (F(2,40) = 2.99, p=.06). Bonferroni 
adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that, for future-new events, both forwards and 
free ordering protocols produced significantly faster detailing than the backwards 
order (ps<.01). In contrast, in the future-old condition, the forward ordering protocol 
was significantly faster than both the backwards and free listing protocols (p<.05), 
which did not reliably differ from each other (p>.05).  
5.3. Discussion 
 The findings of Experiment 3 provide further support for the role of temporal 
organisation in the elaboration of both past and future events. The main aim of 
Experiment 3, however, was to explore the role of novelty, as a function of prior 
experience, on the elaboration production rates for future episodic events. No 
significant differences emerged with respect to the manipulation of temporal direction 
(past vs. future-old) or prior experience (future-old vs. future-new). This suggests that 
the requirement to simulate a completely novel event did not slow down the 
elaboration process when imagining future events. Thus, the observed similarities in 
production rates between memories and future simulations are highly unlikely to be a 
function of memory recasting. Furthermore, given that we chose unlikely events that 
individuals would not have experienced multiple times before it is also difficult to 
argue that the findings reflect greater reliance on schematic information in the 
simulation of future relative to past events. Note that we are using schematic 
information in the sense of knowledge extracted from multiple experienced events in 
the form of scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) or frames (Minsky, 1975). Previous 
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research has shown that future events can be constructed from conceptual knowledge 
from third party sources such as the media (see R.J. Anderson, 2012). This distinction 
is considered further in the General Discussion.  
In light of the findings from Experiment 3, the final study sought to test our 
alternative proposition that the evolution of a memory system designed to serve 
adaptive functions, such as future planning, underlies the similarities in effort required 
to produce elaborative content of memories and future event simulations. Experiment 
4 enlisted a similar method to Experiment 3, with participants’ responses on a life 
events inventory determining cues for event elaboration. In this instance, however, we 
manipulated the role of event likelihood whilst controlling for the role of past 
experience. Thus, we specifically investigated whether events that are perceived as 
likely to occur, indicating that they are active within an individual’s working goal 
framework, lead to faster production rates during the elaboration process. 
6. Experiment 4 
6.1. Method 
6.1.1. Design 
A 2x2x3 within subjects design with independent variables of temporal 
direction (past vs. future), likelihood of occurrence (likely vs. unlikely) and 
elaboration order (forwards vs. backwards vs. free recall). The dependent variable 
was the same as in the Experiments 1b, 2 and 3. 
6.1.2. Participants 
Twenty-one University of Hull undergraduates (16 female) received course 
credit for their participation in this study. Ages ranged from 18 and 47 years (M = 
21.57; SD = 6.48). 
6.1.3. Materials & Procedure 
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This experiment was conducted in two sessions, one week apart. In session 
one, participants completed a 40-item life events inventory. In this study all 40 events 
were common events that participants were likely to have experienced previously 
(e.g. getting a hair cut; going shopping in a big city; baking cookies). Participants 
were asked to indicate whether they had experienced the event before (yes/no) and to 
rate the likelihood of the event happening in the next month on a 5-point scale (1 = 
very unlikely; 5 = very likely). This allowed the investigation of event likelihood 
distinct from prior experience, with only previously experienced (old) events being 
used in the second session.  
The second session involved recall and imagination tasks similar to those 
employed in the previous experiments. For each participant, the 12 events with the 
highest and lowest likelihood scores were used as cues, split evenly among the past 
and future tasks. Again, past and future tasks were counterbalanced across 
participants. The likely and unlikely events were blocked within the past/future tasks, 
with presentation order of likely and unlikely blocks randomised. As in the earlier 
studies, all participants were able to list 10 details for each of the event titles provided 
and on completion of the second session we ensured that participants had not 
experienced any of the events in the intervening week. 
6.2. Results 
A 2x2x3 repeated measures ANOVA investigated the effects of temporal 
direction (past vs. future), likelihood of occurrence (likely vs. unlikely) and 
elaboration order (backwards vs. forwards vs. free recall) on mean response times to 
produce ten episodic details (Table 5). As in the previous experiments, the main effect 
of elaboration order, F(2,40)=12.70, p<.01, ηp2=.39, was significant. Bonferroni 
adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed the same pattern as previously: the free and 
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forwards listing protocols did not differ from each other (p>.05), and both were 
significantly faster than listing in a backwards order (both ps<.01). The main effects 
of temporal direction (F(1,20)=.004, p=.95 and likelihood of occurrence 
(F(1,20)=2.44, p=.13) were not significant. However, the interaction effect between 
temporal direction x likelihood was significant (F(1,20)=4.47, p<.05, ηp2=.18). For 
future events, participants were significantly faster in their elaboration of likely, 
compared with unlikely, events (p<.05). No such difference was found for past events 
(p>.05). Neither the temporal direction x elaboration order, F(2,40) =1.44, p=.25, nor 
the likelihood of occurrence x elaboration order, (F(2,40)=1.57, p=.22, interactions 
were significant. 
6.3. Discussion 
Consistent with Experiments 1 to 3, the findings of Experiment 4 indicate that 
information is organised temporally when elaborating on both past and future events. 
The key aim of this final experiment, however, was to investigate the role of event 
likelihood on the elaboration of past and future events. Specifically, we investigated 
whether events that are perceived as likely to occur, indicating that they are active 
within an individual’s working goal framework, lead to faster production rates during 
the elaboration process. Results indicated that greater likelihood speeded the 
production rate of events, but only when the events were being simulated in the future 
and not when they were being reconstructed from memory. 
The significant interaction evidenced in Experiment 4 lends support to our 
belief that likelihood of events may underlie the finding from Experiment 2, which 
evidenced  faster production rates for future compared with past events. When an 
event is likely to occur in the future, perhaps because it is intended and planned by the 
individual to fit with their working goals, then the provision of a detailed elaboration 
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of that event becomes easier. This, does not, however, appear to be a mere function of 
the frequency of event occurrence, with more frequent events being closely related to 
schemas and/or containing details that are more readily accessible. If this was the case 
then a similar increase in production speed would be observed when elaborating upon 
likely events in the past.  
The likelihood of events is, however, not the only possible mechanism for 
explaining the findings in Experiment 2. The current experiment only asked 
participants about events that were likely to occur within the next month (i.e. the near 
future); in Experiment 2, participants elaborated upon events in both the near and 
distant future. Arguably, the effect of planning and goals on speeding elaboration is 
more fitting with temporally near, rather than distant, events; this, therefore, raises the 
question as to whether planning and goals drive temporally distant, as well as near, 
future thinking. Unfortunately, the event descriptions provided in Experiment 2 do not 
allow us to ascertain whether the events had already been explicitly planned by 
participants.  However, the findings of Experiment 2 were supportive of previous 
work  showing that temporally distant events often represent cultural life script events 
(e.g. wedding day; having children; graduation day). Such events represent 
occurrences that are culturally expected within a typical adult lifespan; thus, whilst 
they may not have been explicitly planned by the participants, they are still events that 
may have been regularly envisioned or discussed.  Future research could attempt to 
tease apart the different roles of future planning, personal goals, and cultural life 
scripts in the elaboration of future events.   
7. General Discussion 
The series of five experiments reported here directly compared the 
organisational structures guiding, and cognitive effort involved in, the elaboration of 
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future simulations and memory retrieval. Previous research has investigated the neural 
and cognitive processes involved in the construction of future episodes, but there has 
been little consideration of the processes involved in the elaboration stage, when 
details of a future event are pieced together in order to provide a coherent description 
of the event (see S. J. Anderson & Conway, 1993). With respect to the organisation of 
information within episodes, the results of all five experiments suggested that 
temporal knowledge structures guide the elaboration of future events. Furthermore, 
the results of Experiments 1a and 1b suggested that information is not organised 
around thematic structures, such as importance or centrality of details. This pattern of 
findings was also evident for past events, which is in line with the findings of S. J. 
Anderson and Conway (1993). 
Our findings do, however, suggest that thematic structures such as an 
individual’s current goals may have a role to play in the elaboration of future events. 
Experiment 4 found that production rates were faster for likely, compared with 
unlikely, events, and that this effect only occurred for the elaboration of future 
episodes. D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2012) found that a significant 
relationship between ratings for likelihood of future events and their importance with 
respect to personal goals.  Thus, we argue that events that are considered likely to 
occur are already active within an individual’s working goals and this speeds the 
elaboration process. This argument fits with other recent work by D’Argembeau and 
colleagues (e.g. D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; D’Argembeau, Lardi, & Van der 
Linden, 2012), who proposed that autobiographical knowledge structures provide a 
framework for organising future events and that personal goals act as key anchors 
within this organisational framework.  
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The current study also investigated whether the elaboration of future events is 
more or less effortful in comparison to the elaboration of memories. We speculated 
that, given the need to selectively retrieve information from disparate memory traces 
in order to elaborate on future episodes, this process might involve more executive 
resources than the elaboration of episodes from memory. Therefore, the time taken to 
record episodic details would be longer for future, compared with past, episodes. 
However, we found no evidence to support this hypothesis in any of the studies. As 
discussed above, Addis et al (2007) found activation in the posterior right middle 
temporal gyrus and the left parietal lobule associated with the elaboration of future, 
but not of past, events, which they attributed to the greater demand on executive 
resources for future events. Despite these differences at the neural level, the current 
study found no difference in the time taken to elaborate on past and future events. It is 
possible that, whilst the elaboration of past and future events make use of the same 
organisation framework, they may engage different cognitive processes that are 
similarly effortful. Whereas the task of future episodic simulation involves the 
selective retrieval and manipulation of details from memory, the task of memory 
recall has its own constraints. For example, the retrieval of memories involves an 
accuracy requirement that is not present when imagining future scenarios. Therefore, 
the necessary inhibition of inaccurate details from alternative memories may require 
cognitive effort. This proposition is one that requires further investigation. To date, 
our understanding of the elaboration phase of future episodic simulation is limited to 
the study by Addis et al and the data presented here. It is crucial, therefore, that 
further studies explore both the neural and cognitive underpinnings of this process, in 
particular the roles of selective retrieval in future thinking and the need for inhibition 
of inaccurate details in memory retrieval. 
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One explanation for why we did not find future elaboration to be a more 
effortful process lies in the possibility that simulation of future episodes does not 
wholly rely on the recombination of episodic details from memory (e.g. Rubin, 2014; 
Szpunar, 2010). Arguably, future thinking is more heavily reliant on abstracted 
information stored within memory schemas. Hierarchical models of autobiographical 
memory (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) suggest that such abstracted 
information is stored at a higher level within the hierarchy, and is thus requires less of 
an effortful search to retrieve, than episodic details. The current findings lend some 
support to this notion as highly familiar events were simulated quicker than they were 
recalled (Experiment 2). Furthermore, recent work has shown that, when situations 
are truly novel, individuals draw on information from a range of sources beyond their 
episodic memory to build future simulations (R. J. Anderson, 2012). However, 
Experiment 3 found that simulations and recollections of unusual events, for which 
participants were unlikely to have schemas, were elaborated upon at a similar rate; 
this suggests that schemas cannot wholly explain the lack of evidenced differences in 
the past and future elaboration processes. Although individuals can draw on 
conceptual knowledge when constructing future events, it is unlikely that participants 
in Experiment 3 had schematic knowledge of the unusual events that could simply be 
recast into a future scenario. The separate roles of conceptual knowledge and schemas 
derived from personally experienced events might be a fruitful topic for future 
research. The current findings, together with those of R.J. Anderson (2012), suggest 
that individuals can draw on a diverse range of sources when constructing future 
events (see Szpunar, 2010), and do not rely solely on personally experienced events. 
The current findings are consistent with the view that episodic memory 
evolved to serve adaptive functions, such as future planning. If episodic memory 
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evolved with the sole purpose of providing an accurate record of the past then we 
would not expect an effortful and error-prone reconstructive process. Thus, the 
reconstructive nature of episodic memory must exist because it serves an adaptive 
function and, therefore, we argue that the underlying systems will have evolved to 
ensure that creating descriptions of future events does not represent a more effortful 
process than memory retrieval. The fact that the process of elaborating on novel 
future events, of which the individual has no direct prior experience, can occur just as 
quickly as memory retrieval is supportive of this argument.  
Furthermore, the findings that likelihood of events speeds the elaboration of 
future, but not past, events lends support to the role of overarching personal goals in 
guiding this adaptive process. As noted above, D’Argembeau and colleagues have 
argued that the planning of future events is constructed around personal goals 
(D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) Although the 
studies presented here did not specifically investigate the role of personal goals, work 
by D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2012) suggests that individuals’ ratings of 
likelihood are closely related to importance of events with respect to current goals; 
therefore, we argue that the manipulation of event likelihood provide an indirect 
measure of events that are in line with the individuals’ working goals. The importance 
of personal goals in the elaboration of future events is also consistent with the 
proposal by Klein et al (2002) that episodic memory evolved to serve future planning. 
However, future work needs to clearly elucidate on the role of personal goals in the 
elaboration of future episodes. 
The current series of experiments set out to systematically compare the 
process of elaboration, distinct from the process of construction, for past and future 
events.  However, Experiment 2-4 required participants to construct events in the first 
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testing session and then elaborate upon them in the second testing session, one week 
later. Arguably, this long time-lag meant that when participants were presented with 
the cues at the second session they had to construct the event again before elaborating 
upon it; thus, our attempt to exclusively examine the process of elaboration may be 
contaminated by elements of the construction process. However, the reaction time 
data collected within these experiments allows us to examine the time taken for 
participants to record episodic details 2-10 (assuming that the construction phase 
occurred before they listed the first episodic detail).  Reanalysis of responses from 
Experiment 2-4 revealed an identical pattern to those reported for all 10 details. Thus, 
we are confident that any interference from the need to reconstruct events generated 
at an earlier session has minimal impact on the findings.     
In conclusion, the work presented here represents the first behavioural 
investigation into whether elaborating upon potential future events relies on similar 
processes to memory elaboration.  We found support for the role of both temporal and 
thematic knowledge structures in organising the elaboration of future events.  
However, we found little evidence to suggest that elaboration on future events was a 
more effortful process compared with memory elaboration.  Whilst a number of 
explanations for this finding have been discussed, more work is needed to fully 
elucidate on the mechanisms and knowledge structures involved in the elaboration 
stage of future episodic thinking.  
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Table	  1	  –	  Mean	  number	  of	  details	  produced	  after	  10	  and	  30	  seconds,	  with	  standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  direction	  and	  elaboration	  order	  (Experiment	  1a)	  	   	  	   	  Elaboration	  Order	   Temporal	  Direction	  Past	   Future	  	  10	  Seconds	   Free	   1.66	  (0.39)	   1.76	  (0.42)	  Forward	   1.66	  (0.37)	   1.54	  (0.42)	  Backward	   1.23	  (0.26)	   1.23	  (0.32)	  Interest	   1.38	  (0.31)	   1.31	  (0.34)	  	  30	  Seconds	   Free	   4.33	  (0.95)	   4.38	  (0.81)	  Forward	   4.29	  (0.79)	   4.22	  (0.89)	  Backward	   3.80	  (0.77)	   3.74	  (0.83)	  Interest	   3.80	  (0.85)	   3.69	  (0.74)	  	  	  	  	  Table	  2	  –	  Mean	  response	  latency	  to	  produce	  10	  episodic	  details	  (secs),	  with	  standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  direction	  and	  elaboration	  order	  (Experiment	  1b)	  	  Elaboration	  Order	   Temporal	  Direction	  Past	   Future	  Free	   88.80	  (24.31)	   88.77	  (27.27)	  Forward	   84.64	  (21.76)	   88.38	  (23.02)	  Backward	   104.88	  (27.47)	   105.47	  (31.04)	  Interest	   102.20	  (27.38)	   102.65	  (27.72)	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  Table	  3	  -­‐	  Mean	  response	  latency	  to	  produce	  10	  episodic	  details	  (secs),	  with	  standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  direction,	  temporal	  distance,	  and	  elaboration	  order	  (Experiment	  2)	  	   Temporal	  Direction	  and	  Distance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elaboration	  Order	   Past	   Future	  Near	   Far	   Near	   Far	  Free	   117.37	  (39.98)	   130.71	  (38.41)	   107.58	  (31.19)	   114.62	  (26.74)	  Forwards	   113.70	  (34.21)	   121.19	  (40.34)	   109.24	  (34.15)	   114.40	  (34.01)	  Backwards	   129.76	  (42.69)	   133.99	  (38.67)	   116.88	  (26.73)	   125.41	  (31.38)	  	  	  	  Table	  4	  –	  Mean	  response	  latency	  to	  produce	  10	  episodic	  details	  (secs),	  with	  standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  direction,	  prior	  experience	  and	  elaboration	  order	  (Experiment	  3)	  	   Temporal	  Direction	  and	  Prior	  Experience	  Elaboration	  Order	   Past	   Future-­‐Old	   Future-­‐New	  Free	   119.58	  (42.66)	   122.54	  (54.36)	   108.33	  (35.86)	  Forwards	   123.98	  (46.46)	   112.28	  (38.23)	   113.08	  (48.21)	  Backwards	   132.04	  (60.41)	   123.52	  (39.36)	   132.	  05	  (57.31)	  	  	  	  Table	  5	  –	  Mean	  response	  latency	  to	  produce	  10	  episodic	  details	  (secs),	  with	  standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  direction,	  event	  likelihood	  and	  elaboration	  order	  (Experiment	  4)	  	   Temporal	  Direction	  and	  Event	  Likelihood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elaboration	  Order	   Past	   Future	  Likely	   Unlikely	   Likely	   Unlikely	  Free	   98.84	  (29.17)	   102.28	  (34.61)	   99.65	  (39.59)	   108.37	  (35.17)	  Forwards	   104.40	  (32.42)	   101.76	  (34.50)	   96.99	  (30.96)	   106.56	  (34.81)	  Backwards	   115.52	  (36.56)	   110.05	  (34.97)	   108.65	  (32.76)	   111.91	  (38.96)	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